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Atomic Event Concepts in Perception,
Action, and Belief
ABSTRACT: Event concepts are unstructured atomic concepts that apply to event
types. A paradigm example of such an event type would be that of diaper
changing, and so a putative example of an atomic event concept would be
DADDY’S-CHANGING-MY-DIAPER. I will defend two claims about such
concepts. First, the conceptual claim that it is in principle possible to possess a
concept such as DADDY’S-CHANGING-MY-DIAPER without possessing the
concept DIAPER. Second, the empirical claim that we actually possess such
concepts and that they play an important role in our cognitive lives. The
argument for the empirical claim has the form of an inference to the best
explanation and is aimed at those who are already willing to attribute concepts
and beliefs to infants and nonhuman animals. Many animals and prelinguistic
infants seem capable of re-identifying event-types in the world, and they seem to
store information about things happening at particular times and places. My
account offers a plausible model of how such organisms are able to do this
without attributing linguistically structured mental states to them. And although
language allows adults to form linguistically structured mental representations of
the world, there is no good reason to think that such structured representations
necessarily replace the unstructured ones. There is also no good reason for a
philosopher who is willing to explain the behavior of an organism by appealing
to atomic concepts of individuals or kinds to not use a similar form of
explanation when explaining the organism’s capacity to recognize events.
We can form empirical concepts of individuals, kinds, properties, event-types,
and states of affairs, among other things, and I assume that such concepts
function like what François Recanati calls ‘mental files’ or what Ruth Millikan
calls ‘substance concepts’ (Recanati ; Millikan , , ). To
possess such a concept one must have a reliable capacity to re-identify the object
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in question, but this capacity of re-identification does not fix the reference of the
concept. Such concepts allow us to collect and utilize useful information about
things that we re-encounter in our environment. We can distinguish between a
perception-action system and a perception-belief system, and I will argue that
empirical concepts, including atomic event concepts, can play a role in both
systems. The perception-action system involves the application of concepts in the
service of (often skilled) action. We can think of the concept as a mental file
containing motor-plans that can be activated once the individual recognizes that
they are in a certain situation. In this way, recognizing something (whether an
object or an event) as a token of a type, plays a role in guiding immediate action.
The perception-belief system, in contrast, allows for the formation of beliefs that
can play a role in deliberation and planning and in the formation of
expectations. I distinguish between two particular types of belief which I call
where-beliefs and when-beliefs, and I argue that we can model the formation of
such perceptual beliefs in nonlinguistic animals and human infants in terms of
the formation of a link between an empirical concept and a position on a
cognitive map. According to the account offered, seemingly complex beliefs,
such as a baby’s belief that Daddy changed her diaper in the kitchen earlier, will
not be linguistically structured. If we think that prelinguistic infants possess such
concepts and are able to form such beliefs, it is likely that adults do too. The
ability to form such beliefs does not require the capacity for public language,
and we can model them in nonlinguistic terms; thus, we have no good reason to
think of such beliefs as propositional attitudes. Of course, we can use sentences
to refer to such beliefs, and thus it is possible to think of such beliefs as
somehow relations to propositions. But it is not clear to me what is gained by
this as we have a perfectly good way to think about the structure of such beliefs
that does not involve any appeal to language.
KEYWORDS: mental files, perception, memory, cognitive maps, belief, animal
cognition, Millikan
Introduction
Timothy Williamson (:) plausibly claims that any plausible account of
perception must be able to distinguish between seeing a situation in which Olga is
playing chess and seeing that Olga is playing chess. And he argues that one cannot
see that Olga is playing chess without possessing the concept CHESS. I take it that
Williamson thinks this claim is conceptually or metaphysically necessary. I will
reject this argument, claiming that one is able to see that Olga is playing chess if
one possesses the concept OLGA’S-PLAYING-CHESS; because such event
concepts do not need to be internally structured, it is possible to possess the
concept OLGA’S-PLAYING-CHESS without possessing the concept CHESS. The
motivation for such a position should appeal to those who are sympathetic to
externalist accounts of the content of natural kind concepts; just as we can have
atomic concepts of individuals and kinds, we can also have atomic concepts of
event-types and situation-types. Just as the concept WATER applies to a particular
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kind of stuff, the concept OLGA’S-PLAYING-CHESS applies to a particular kind of
event. Now, even though water is HO, and hence, being water entails containing
oxygen, possessing the concept WATER does not entail possessing the concept
OXYGEN. Similarly, even though Olga’s playing chess entails somebody playing
chess, possessing the concept OLGA’S-PLAYING-CHESS does not entail
possessing the concept CHESS.
In addition to playing a role in perceptual recognition, atomic event concepts are
also involved in what I call where-beliefs, such as the belief that there is beer in the
fridge, and when-beliefs, such as the belief that Olga played chess yesterday or
that she (generally) plays chess after lunch. Such beliefs involve creating a link
between a concept and a position on a cognitive map—thus, they do have some
structure, just not a linear sentential structure. My where-belief that there is beer
in the fridge involves creating a link between the concept BEER and a particular
position on my cognitive map of my apartment. The belief that Olga (generally)
plays chess after lunch involves creating a link between the concept
OLGA’S-PLAYING-CHESS and a position on my cognitive map of a (generic)
day. Thus, it is possible in principle that one can believe that Olga plays chess
after lunch without possessing the concept CHESS. Where-beliefs and
when-beliefs are beliefs about the occurrence of particular objects, instances of
kinds, stuffs, events, and states of affairs at particular times and places. Such
beliefs do not require the possession of language. For example, a chimpanzee may
believe that there are (now) fruits in a certain part of the forest or that a lion has
been in the vicinity recently. And a prelinguistic infant may believe that she ate
before playing with her mummy or that daddy is now changing her diaper. When
one attributes these beliefs, one uses syntactically structured English sentences, but
one does not need to attribute syntactically structured representations to animals
and infants in order to attribute such beliefs to them. To possess when-beliefs and
where-beliefs, an animal merely needs (a) a concept of the individual, kind, or
event type and (b) some sort of inner cognitive map. These maps can be either
spatial or temporal, and the concepts involved in such beliefs need not have any
internal syntactic structure. This account is designed to be empirically plausible
and to apply to nonlinguistic animals and prelinguistic infants, who are capable of
both perceptually guided action and remembering the spatial and temporal
locations of objects and events.
In adulthood, our capacities for perceptually guided action and belief formation
are clearly greatly enhanced by the development of our linguistic capacities; for
example, with the development of language our range of concepts is massively
increased, and we can form when-beliefs and where-beliefs as the result of
testimony. But I assume for evolutionary and developmental reasons that adult
perception is not radically different from animal perception, and so we should
There are at least two types of when-beliefs. Beliefs about particular past episodes (which are related to
episodic memory), such as the belief that Olga played chess yesterday, and beliefs about regularly occurring
events, such as the belief that Olga plays chess (every afternoon) after lunch. These beliefs involve different types
of temporal maps.
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assume that our basic capacity to form when-beliefs and where-beliefs is not
dependent upon our linguistic capacities.
On this account, whatWilliamson refers to as seeing that is a form of recognition,
which involves grasping an object, event, or state of affairs conceptually. Like many
philosophers, I believe that the most plausible theory of concepts is a version of an
externalist direct reference account, according to which the reference of a concept
is determined by its function. One way of thinking about such concepts is as
mental files. There are three important aspects of concepts understood as mental
files. First, they have an extension. Second, they are used to store information.
And third, we normally have a reliable but fallible way of recognizing instances of
the concept. The extension of a concept is fixed neither by the information
contained in the file nor by our means of recognizing instances of the concept.
Rather, the extension is fixed by the function of the concept. Thus, for example,
one can think of the acquisition of an empirical concept such as CAT as involving
the creation of a cat-file, which can then be used to store useful information about
cats. The function of the file is to collect and store useful information about cats.
Similarly, the function of the Olga’s-playing-chess-file, if we possess one, is to
collect and store information about events of this type.
It is clear that many nonlinguistic animals are able to recognize and reidentify
individual objects and members of certain kinds, and thus it is plausible to assume
that they possess concepts of individuals and kinds. There are good reasons to
think, however, that many animals, including great apes and prelinguistic infants,
also have the capacity to recognize and re-identify event and situation types. For
example, most infants seem to learn to re-identify the event of diaper changing.
If we are willing to ascribe concepts to such animals in the first kind of case, there
is no good reason not to tell a similar story in the second kind of case.
If we think that seeing that involves the exercise of recognitional capacities that may
play a role in immediately guiding action and that belief formation has to do with the
formation of mental states that play a role in offline deliberation and planning, then it
seems likely that there will be frequent cases of perceptual knowledge without belief,
for often there is simply not enough time for deliberation and planning. And by the
time one does have an opportunity to reflect and deliberate, the situation has
changed, and there will be no need to store information. Given that belief formation
is likely to have some costs, it is likely that we will not form beliefs concerning
everything we recognize. Good examples of such situations are complex learned
skilled activities, where we often use quite complex perceptual capacities in a way
that is too quick for the deliberative system to come into play. For example, the
event-concept CAR-AHEAD-SLOWING-DOWN plays a role in the skilled picking
up of a particular affordance, setting in train and guiding the driver’s reaction, often
without attention. The development of these perceptual capacities may be
influenced by our higher cognitive capacities, as acquiring such concepts and
learning to apply them accurately often takes a long period of conscious training;
such training is often guided by language. But once we have acquired a certain
perceptual skill, there will often be no time and no need for conscious deliberation
and therefore no need for belief formation. In the absence of any need to form the
corresponding belief, I suspect that we often fail to form beliefs about what we
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perceptually recognize. According to the model I am defending, such beliefs play no
role in the immediate guidance of action, and in cases where things are changing
quickly there seems to be no strong need for forming beliefs that could play a role in
future deliberation. Therefore, I suggest it is highly likely that seeing that often does
not lead to the formation of the corresponding where-beliefs and when-beliefs. For
example, I can see that the car ahead is slowing down and react appropriately
without forming the corresponding belief.
. Bees and Babies
In order to motivate my account of the relationship between perception and belief,
I will show how it can be used to model the cognition of very simple organisms,
bees (for a defense of the claim that bees do literally have beliefs and desires, see
Carruthers [:–]). The function of the following discussion of bees is to
show how my way of thinking of the distinction between the perception-action
system and the perception-belief system and the role of concepts for each system
can be applied to the simple case of bees. And then I will try and show how this
account can be scaled up to involve more complex cases involving event concepts.
The main function of this discussion of bees is to show the descriptive and
conceptual adequacy of my model of cognition. This descriptive claim is supposed
to play a role in supporting an inference to the best explanation argument to
support my empirical claim about the role of concepts and beliefs in our cognitive
economy. A background assumption here is the methodological principle
advocated by Paul Grice that in offering an account of psychological concepts we
should aim to ‘safeguard the unity of psychological concepts in their application
to animals and to human beings’ (:). For Grice this commitment is
central to his program of ‘creature construction’, which is part of a constructivist
program of conceptual clarification and justification. I am sympathetic to his
general methodology and agree that the best way of clarifying our own
psychological concepts is by offering a series of increasingly complex
psychological models of increasingly complex creatures. And so my following
discussion of psychological models of organisms of various levels of complexity
can also be understood in Gricean terms as designed to play a role in clarifying
our own psychological concepts.
Where-beliefs. Bees leave the hive in search of nectar. Theymay begin by foraging,
but when they find flowers, they will start harvesting nectar; having collected the
nectar, they will return to the hive. If, among other things, (a) they found a good
source of nectar, (b) there are a number of bees waiting around the hive, and (c)
there is evidence that the hive is low on nectar, the bee will communicate the
The claim that bees have both a perception-action system and a perception-belief system does not entail that
bees have two streams of visual processing in theway that primates seem to have. The distinction between these two
systems in bees is functional, and I assume these functionally distinct systems are underwritten by distinct brain
circuits. In primate visual perception, following Milner and Goodale (), I suspect that the distinction
between these two systems corresponds to the distinction between the dorsal and ventral streams of visual
processing. But my distinction between these two systems does not presuppose the existence of two separate
streams of visual processing.
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source of the nectar with a dance. This dance is in the form of a figure eight and
communicates two pieces of information: the direction and distance from the hive
(Gould ; Gould and Gould ; and Menzel ). There is strong
empirical evidence that bees navigate using an internal, allocentric map of their
local environments, probably using a polar coordinate system with the hive at the
center. Evidence for the existence of such maps is the fact that, as Menzel et al.
() have shown, bees are able to take novel shortcuts between points. Cruse
and Wehner (), however, are skeptical of Menzel’s claims and have argued
that the capacity to use novel shortcuts between known points does not require an
internal cognitive map. For a convincing response, see Cheeseman et al ().
There is also evidence that bees have a separate map of the interior of the hive.
We can think of the bee as having three interrelated cognitive systems: a
perceptual system, a navigation system, and a where-belief formation system. Bees
have an innate capacity to recognize flowers, and when they find a patch of
flowers, they start harvesting the nectar. We can think of this capacity as involving
the existence of a concept FLOWER. And we can think of this concept as a very
simple mental file that contains simple instructions and links to motor plans. In
particular, we can think of the FLOWER file as containing something like the
following instruction: If flowers are detected and nectar has not already been
collected, the bee starts harvesting. Thus, once the bee recognizes a flower, it will
change its activity from foraging to harvesting. Now, recognizing a flower does
not just lead to a change in activity, but it also leads to the formation of a
where-belief. The bee forms the belief that there are flowers at this particular
location, and this belief will play a role in future planning and communication
when it returns to the hive. The bee is able to form a where-belief by associating a
point on its internal map with the concept FLOWER. Let us call this point on the
map point p. We can say that the perception of flowers causes the bee to form the
belief that there are flowers at point p. When the bee returns to the hive, the bee
can use this belief either to communicate this information to other bees or to
return to the spot itself to collect more nectar. Bees also dance to communicate the
location of water, resin, and new nest sites (Menzel, ).
Similarly, there is behavior evidence that chimpanzees ‘use long-term spatial
memory to monitor food sources’ and ‘aim travel actively towards specific trees to
check for the availability of new fruit’ (Janmaat et al. :). Forest
chimpanzees live in dense forests with low visibility and where ripe fruit (which is
their main food source) is distributed irregularly both spatially and temporally.
They are skilled foragers who are able to return to a particular high-quality
feeding tree from various directions and when they do so they take a linear path,
suggesting that they are not navigating by using landmarks but instead use an
internal Euclidian cognitive map (Ban and Normand ; thus, Ban and
Normand conclude that ‘Taï chimpanzees keep a map of their territory in mind,
including a notion of direction and feeding tree locations’ [:]). There is
evidence that chimpanzees return to particular individual trees that were rich in
fruit in previous years (Janmaat :). There is also behavioral evidence that
chimpanzees and other primates use the discovery of ripe fruit on one tree as
evidence for fruit on other trees of the same species—which suggests that they do
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not just store information about individual foraging places, but also about species.
(Janmaat :). This indicates that chimpanzees possess concepts of both
individual trees and species. And I suggest that the best way to explain the
behavioral evidence is in terms of the creation of a link between concepts (of
individuals and kinds) and positions on cognitive maps.
It is highly likely that adult human beings are also able to form where-beliefs in a
similar way, and such beliefs should not be thought of as linguistically structured.We
have various internal maps: for example, I have a rough internal map of my
apartment, of my local neighborhood, of London, and so on. And we are able to
link various concepts to positions on these maps. Thus, my belief that there is beer
in my fridge, which plays an important role in my long-term deliberation and
planning, involves marking the concept BEER as instantiated at a certain point on
my internal map of my apartment. And assuming that we also have atomic
concepts of events, I can also form many beliefs that would seem much more
complex when expressed linguistically in a similar way. It seems plausible that one
way we have of keeping track of where things are does not involve linguistically
encoded information.
Now this simple process can break down for a number of different reasons—and
thinking about the way in which a simple system like the one described above could
break down allows us to provide a simple taxonomy of various forms of cognitive
misrepresentation. Even if one does not think that bees literally have beliefs, the
simple taxonomy of forms of misrepresentation that this simple model allows us
to build is one that can be applied to human cognition. This simple model
suggests that we need to distinguish between at least three possible ways of
forming false beliefs, which we can call () misperception, () mislocation, and ()
misbelief. Misperception involves deploying an inappropriate concept in
perception, and such misperception usually causes us to form the corresponding
false belief. Thus, for example, I may misperceive a bottle of iced tea as a bottle of
beer and form the false belief that there is beer in the fridge. Mislocation, on the
other hand, is the formation of false when-beliefs and where-beliefs as a result of
mislocating oneself. For example, I may think I am in my own apartment and see
beer in the fridge and so form the belief that there is beer in my fridge, but I am
actually in an apartment very similar to my own in another city. (We could be in
the position of the protagonist in the classic Soviet film, Irony of Fate.) Misbelief
is the formation of a false belief in the absence of misperception or mislocation.
And there are many such sources of false belief. For example, I may form a false
belief as a result of reasoning or on the basis of testimony or because my belief
system is damaged. Finally, there may be a breakdown between the perceptual
recognition system and the belief formation system, such that the perceptual
recognition does not cause the corresponding belief because of a lack of
communication between the perceptual system and the belief system (or perhaps
because this communication is overridden). We can call such a ‘breakdown’ a lack
of belief formation.
When-beliefs. There is also behavioral evidence that animals are capable of
storing temporal information; for example, bees can learn to return to a feeder at
a particular time of day when it has been replenished. For chimpanzees the
ATOMIC EVENT CONCEPTS IN PERCEPT ION, ACT ION, AND BEL IEF 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 14 Dec 2021 at 15:19:56, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use.
‘availability of nutritious rainforest food, like young leaves and ripe fruit, can be
highly episodic and patchily distributed in time and space’ (Janmaat et al.
:). As a result, chimpanzees have to keep track not only of where the
best fruit trees are to be found, but also of when the fruit on particular trees is
ripe, and there is behavioral evidence that wild chimpanzees are capable of
learning about both the spatial and temporal locations of good sources of food.
One form of evidence has to do with the fact that chimpanzees seem to leave their
camp for breakfast earlier when the fruit they plan to eat is (like figs) ‘ephemeral’
in the sense that it is more likely to be depleted quickly by other animals. This
behavior suggests that their planning is not just sensitive to spatial information,
but also to temporal information (Janmaat :). There is, then, good
experimental evidence that chimpanzees have at least short term ‘‘what, where
and when’ memory’ (Janmaat, Ban, and Boesch :). Although the behavioral
evidence for storage of temporal information is less extensive than that for spatial
evidence, it is clear that many nonhuman animals do somehow encode temporal
information.
There is also strong behavioral evidence that prelinguistic infants are capable of
forming when-beliefs and not just about the temporal location of objects, but also
about the temporal location of events as they start learning daily routines at some
point during their first year. Thus, Nina Vaid Raoji argues, ‘when the same thing
is done at approximately the same time interval, baby quickly learns the sequence
and will anticipate the next step’.
The best way of modeling such capacities in infants is in terms of the creation of a
link between an event concept and a position on a (one-dimensional) temporal map.
For example, forming the belief that a certain event happens at a certain time involves
marking an event concept as instantiated at a particular point on a temporal
cognitive map. One form of such a temporal map will be a simple timeline. Such
timelines play an important role in ordering memories. But in addition to simple
timelines, we also seem to possess cyclical timelines that allow us to recognize and
create routines by keeping track of the order and the timing of regularly repeated
event types. Thus, for example, it seems that in their first year, human babies
develop something like a map of a day and then work out which events are
regularly repeated in which order, learning when to expect breakfast, lunch,
dinner, and bedtime and other daily routines. Later in development, the child may
learn additional cyclical timelines, such as the week and the year, in order to learn
weekly and yearly routines. We also seem to possess a simple (noncyclical) linear
map of the past, which can play a role in ordering nonlinguistically formulated
episodic memories. Forming a particular when-belief, then, can be thought of as
creating a link between an (event) concept and a position on one of these temporal
Quoted from ‘What YouNeed ToKnowAbout Setting A Baby Schedule’, https://www.thebump.com/a/baby-
schedules. In the same argument, Cheryl Wu argues that ‘At  months, you’ll notice that baby has some sort of
pattern throughout the day. . . . Usually around  months, they’ll get into a rhythm for nighttime sleep, sleeping
about  hours at night and waking up two or three times throughout the night. A daytime schedule emerges
for most babies around  months of age.’ I believe that the judgment of healthcare professionals and primary
caregivers is a good source of evidence about such matters. For a good discussion of the epistemic value of the
judgments of primary caregivers, see Reddy ().
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maps. Importantly, these capacities can be explained without attributing
linguistically structured representations to the infant.
The position I have just sketched posits the existence of both spatial and temporal
cognitive maps and the existence of (atomic) concepts, not only of individuals and
kinds, but also of situations and events. In the following section I present empirical
evidence for the existence of internal cognitive spatial and temporal maps. It is
significant that their neural implementation seems to be located in the
hippocampus. There is also evidence that ‘concept cells’ are also located in the
hippocampus. This suggests as an empirical hypothesis that the hippocampus plays
a critical role in the formation of when-beliefs and where-beliefs. In the section after
that, I will defend the existence of atomic events and situation concepts, arguing
that anyone who is happy to posit atomic concepts of individuals and kinds should
be comfortable with atomic concepts of events and situations.
. Spatial and Temporal Cognitive Maps
The existence of spatial cognitive maps in mammals is well established. Following
John O’Keefe’s seminal work on ‘place cells’ in rats, it is now widely accepted that
mammals have internal cognitive maps, with strong evidence for the existence of
such maps provided both by brain studies and behavioral studies. O’Keefe
discovered that particular nerve cells in the hippocampus, which he called ‘place
cells’, were activated when a rat was in a certain location. These cells seem to form
a two-dimensional (horizontal) map of the environment (see O’Keefe and
Dostrovsky ; O’Keefe ). O’Keefe argued that the hippocampus is able to
form multiple maps of its various environments and that these play a central role
in spatial memory, planning, and deliberation. Later work by May-Britt Moser
and Edvard Moser, with whom O’Keefe was jointly awarded a Nobel Prize in
, demonstrated the existence of ‘grid cells’ in the entorhinal cortex, which are
closely linked to the place cells (see Fyhn et al. ); Sargolini et al. ). These
grid cells seem to play a role in applying a metric to the cognitive map encoding
directionally tagged distances, functioning somewhat like an odometer (see Jeffery
:). As O’Keefe (:–) explains, ‘cognitive maps . . . consist of a set
of places and a mechanism for linking these place representations together in
terms of the distance and direction between them.’ A similar neural system seems
to be found in all mammals, including human beings. In patients with Alzheimer’s
disease, the hippocampus and entorhinal cortex are often damaged in the early
stages of the disease, and this damage seems to be the neurological cause of
problems with navigation and spatial memory. The neurological and behavioral
evidence for temporal cognitive maps is weaker than for spatial maps—but
perhaps this is merely a function of the greater difficulty in collecting data on
temporal as opposed to spatial cognition and the fact that less work has been
done on this topic. Already in the late s O’Keefe argued that while there was
no evidence that rats have temporal maps, there was already strong evidence that
human beings do have a spatial-temporal system and that this plays a role in
remembering narratives (O’Keefe :). And more recent work seems to have
demonstrated the existence of temporal cognitive maps and the existence of cells
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functioning as ‘time cells’ in addition to place cells in nonhumanmammals as well as
in human beings. These time cells are neurons in the hippocampus that ‘fire at specific
moments in temporally structured experiences’ and, in effect, keep track of the
temporal order and duration of events (Salz et al., :). Buzsáki and Llinás
() have shown that for rats, ‘during wheel or treadmill running in a memory
task, the ordinal sequence of neurons faithfully track elapsed duration (termed
“time cells”)’ (). Damage to the hippocampus in both human beings and rats
interferes with the capacity to learn and remember the sequential order of events.
Similar results have been shown by Schiller et al. (), who argue that
‘numerous studies have revealed that the hippocampus plays a critical role in
remembering the order of events in specific experiences’ (). Summing up this
recent research, Eichenbaum argues that time cells may:
play a role in episodic memory by tagging when events occur in time, just
as place cells map where events occur in space so that the hypothesis is
that time cells do for memory the same things that place cells do.
Considered together, time cells and place cells organize events in
different relational dimensions to provide cognitive maps in time and
space respectively. (Lisman et al. :)
We have strong empirical evidence, then, that human beings and other mammals
possess internal spatial and temporal cognitive maps and neuroscientists are
beginning to understand how such maps are implemented neuronally in the
hippocampus. There is also some evidence for the existence of ‘concept cells’ in
the hippocampus. These are cells that ‘respond in a remarkably selective and
abstract manner to particular persons or objects’ (Quiroga :). I have
suggested that we can think of where-beliefs and when-beliefs as establishing
connections between concepts and positions on such maps. Where-beliefs involve
creating a link between a concept and a position on a spatial map (perhaps
encoded by a system of place cells), and when-beliefs involve creating a link
between a concept and a position on a temporal map (perhaps encoded by a
system of time cells). Given that there is strong evidence for the localization of
cognitive maps to the hippocampus and some evidence for the existence of
‘concept cells’ in the hippocampus, it does not seem implausible as an empirical
hypothesis that the hippocampus plays a critical role in the formation of
when-beliefs and where-beliefs, which might involve the creation of neuronal
connections between ‘concept cells’ and cognitive maps. Given that the
hippocampus is not thought to have a central role in linguistic processing, such a
localization would support the idea that where-beliefs and when-beliefs should

‘When patients with hippocampal damage were examined after a tour around a campus, they could recall
spatial and temporal aspects and details about particular events. However, whereas control participants could
well remember the sequential order of the tour events even a month later, the patients’ recalled order of events
was unrelated to reality. . . . Hippocampal damage in rats also induces a deficit in learning sequential order of
odor stimuli’ (Buzsáki and Llinás :).
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not be modeled in linguistic terms. Although research in this area is at an early stage,
the model I am defending is, at the least, consistent with recent empirical work.
. Event Concepts as Substance Concepts
In addition to being committed to the existence of internal spatial and temporal
cognitive maps, my account presupposes that we have concepts not only of
individuals, kinds and stuffs, but that we also have concepts of event types and
situation types. Such atomic event and situation concepts can be thought of as
what Ruth Millikan () calls ‘substances concepts’. For Millikan, the
ontological category ‘substances’, as she uses the term, is roughly ‘that extensive
category consisting of items about which it is possible to learn from one encounter
something about what to expect on other encounters’ (). And the concept of a
substance ‘is the capacity to represent the substance in thought for the purpose of
information gathering and storage, inference, and ultimately the guidance of
action’ (–; see also Millikan [:]; I prefer Millikan’s earlier expression
‘substance concept’ rather than her more recent [] term ‘unicept’).
The function of substance concepts is not to classify things or to describe them,
but to identify and re-identify them in the service of informed action. Millikan
herself focuses on three types of substance concepts: concepts of individuals
(Mama), kinds (mouse), and stuffs (milk). She suggests, however, without
elaborating on it, that event-types can also be substances in this sense, for there
are many types of event about which one can learn on a single encounter how to
behave on future encounters with the same event-type. In particular, it seems
clear that infants show a capacity for re-identifying event types that are parts of
social routines, and the capacity to re-identify such events plays an important
role in early learning. For example, a baby is able to recognize when her father is
about to change her diaper and learns how to move her legs in a cooperative
way. Diaper changing is an event type that recurs frequently and creates a
regular structure in a baby’s life. But in order to learn how to cooperate, the
baby must have a capacity to re-identify the event type. That is, the baby must
possess the relevant substance concept, perhaps in this case, the concept
DADDY’S-CHANGING-MY-DIAPER. One could tell a similar story about the
capacity to re-identify the event type of ‘being picked up’. Reddy, Markova, and
Wallot () have shown that even at two months, babies are able to anticipate
and therefore recognize when they are about to be picked up. This capacity to
re-identify event types plays an enormous role in our cognitive lives and
development, and hence event concepts must also play a central role. From the
evidence available, it seems that chimpanzees are capable of learning event
concepts that play a role in guiding action. And the evidence from foraging
behavior suggests that they are capable of forming when-beliefs and
where-beliefs about individuals and kinds. It is not clear, however, whether they
are able to form when-beliefs and where-beliefs about events.
There is evidence that some nonhuman primates possess such a capacity for
re-identifying social event types, and thus they would possess substance concepts
of these event types in Millikan’s sense. For example, chimpanzees are able to
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recognize a hand-raise signal as an invitation to play. This is a clear case of learning
to recognize and re-identify a particular event type. Tomasello () offers a
plausible three-stage account of how chimpanzees learn to pick up on a hand-raise
as an invitation to play in the following terms:
(i) initially one youngster approaches another with rough-and-tumble
play in mind, raises his arm in preparation to play-hit the other, and
then actually hits, jumps on, and begins playing; (ii) over repeated
instances, the recipient learns to anticipate this sequence on the basis
of the initial arm-raise alone, and so begins to play upon perceiving
this initial step; and (iii) the communicator eventually learns to
anticipate this anticipation, and so raises his arm, monitors the
recipient, and waits for her to react—expecting this arm-raise to
initiate the play. ()
I suggest that at stage two, what the chimp perceives when he sees the initial step
is that the other chimp wants to play. Nim indicates that he wants to play by raising
his arm and Chim has learnt to recognize this arm-raising as an invitation to play.
In such a case, it is clear that Chim does not just see a scene in which Nim is
inviting him to play, but he sees that Nim is inviting him to play, and I take
it that the best explanation for this is that Chim possesses the relevant
event-concept. The event type is that of an invitation to play, and Chim is has
learnt to recognize tokens of this type of event and respond appropriately. I take
it that this offers support for the empirical claim that some nonhuman animals
possess event concepts.
It is likely that something similar occurs between young infants and their primary
carers in the establishment of routines and in terms of theway skilled athletes learn to
‘read’ their teammates. And there are certain moves that daddy makes when he is
about to start changing the baby’s diaper; indeed, it is often the case that he has,
perhaps not consciously, learnt to make these moves in order to indicate that he
wants to change her diaper. And the baby has learnt to pick up on these
indications and so is able to see that Daddy is about to change her diaper. There
is no good reason to think that we lose this capacity to form atomic event
concepts in adulthood.
. Seeing Olga’s Playing Chess
Williamson (: ) argues that
There is a distinction between seeing that A and seeing a situation in
which A. One difference is that only the former requires the perceiver
to grasp the proposition that A. A normal observer in normal
conditions who has no concept of chess can see a situation in which
Olga is playing chess, by looking in the right direction, but cannot see
that Olga is playing chess, because he does not know what he sees to
be a situation in which Olga is playing chess.
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Williamson is right that any adequate account of perceptual knowledge has to be
able to give an account of the distinction between seeing a situation in which Olga
is playing chess and seeing that Olga is playing chess. I argue, contra Williamson,
that one can see that Olga is playing chess without possessing the concept CHESS.
An infant can possess the concept MUMMY’S-PLAYING-CHESS without
possessing the concept CHESS. For such an infant, there will be a clear difference
between seeing a situation in which his mother (Olga) is playing chess and seeing
that his mother is playing chess. In addition, the infant will be able to form (de re)
where-beliefs and when-beliefs about Olga’s playing chess by making links
between the atomic concept and positions on spatial and/or temporal cognitive
maps. For example, he may form the belief that Olga is playing chess in the
kitchen by forming a link between the concept and a position on his cognitive
map of his house, and he may form the belief that Olga plays chess after lunch by
forming a link between the concept and a position on her cognitive map of a day.
Thus, the prelinguistic infant may be able to form the belief that his mother played
chess after lunch in the kitchen, without possessing the concept chess. And so the
distinction between ‘seeing a scene in which’ and ‘seeing that’ need not be cashed
out in terms that involve ‘grasping a proposition’, as Williamson suggests. And
being able to see that does not require any linguistic capacities or linguistically
structured mental states. Instead, what is involved in the type of perceptual
knowledge expressed by the English sentence ‘Tim sees that Olga is playing chess’
is that Tim accurately grasps a situation in which Olga is playing chess by
deploying the concept OLGA’S-PLAYING-CHESS. Although we refer to such
concepts using complex internally structured phrases, such concepts may be
atomic. Indeed, it is likely that in development our earliest concepts of complex
event types are atomic, and only later in development do these concepts become
articulated. The way in which atomic event concepts become articulated is
analogous to the way in which infants, in their linguistic development, slowly
come to recognize the internal structure of what start out as holophrases.
Empirical research shows that in terms of the development of their linguistic
capacities, infants begin by expressing ‘complex’ thoughts with holophrases, that
is, ‘one-word utterances with which the toddler expresses an entire sentence’
(Rowe and Levine : ). This is the orthodox position of those who study
language acquisition. It is common for infants to learn expressions such as
‘ice cream’ or ‘I love you’ as single lexical items before they learn to articulate
their internal structure. It is only later in development that they begin to
understand the internal structure of such expressions. A similar story should be
told about the development of our event concepts, which start as atomic event
concepts and are articulated only later in development.
Take, for example, an infant—let us call him Tim. His mother, Olga, plays chess
most afternoons with various friends, and Tim has learnt to identify when this
particular activity is going on and has stored quite a bit of practical information
about what to expect in such situations. In such a case, we can say that Tim has
acquired the concept MUMMY’S-PLAYING-CHESS. Although we are able to
refer to this concept as MUMMY’S-PLAYING-CHESS, for Tim this is an atomic
concept, a concept without internal structure. It is the mental equivalent of a
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singular term—the mental equivalent of the name of an event type; Tim is reliably,
albeit fallibly, able to recognize situations in which his mother, Olga, is playing chess
and is able to use this capacity to collect and retrieve information about events of this
type. Tim may have no understanding that chess is a game that involves turn-taking
and winning or losing. But, like us, he is able to identify situations in which Olga is
playing chess, but what he takes to be entailed by such a situation is quite different
from an adult’s understanding of the situation. Tim may understand that he should
not knock the pieces over and that his mother will not pay much attention to him.
Over time, Toddler Tim becomes Teenage Tim. Tim learns that chess is a game
and that it has winners and losers. He learns how to play chess himself and comes
to be able to recognize when his mother is winning or losing and when his mother
has just been checkmated. As this learning occurs, Tim’s concept of
MUMMY’S-PLAYING-CHESS becomes articulated. He will come to recognize,
for example, that mummy’s playing chess entails somebody’s playing chess and
mummy’s doing something, but there is no good reason to assume that these facts
imply that his concept has changed. Anyone convinced of externalist accounts of
concept identity for names should be sympathetic to such an account for event
concepts as well. As Putnam argues, ‘speakers who lived before Dalton introduced
the modern notion of a chemical compound referred to the same liquid when they
used the term “water”. The word does not change its meaning every time we
discover a better account of the nature of water. The meaning and reference of
“water” aren’t what has changed; it is our knowledge about water that has
changed. The meaning of “water” isn’t fixed by a definition, either in terms of the
observable properties of the substance or in terms of the properties mentioned in
our latest scientific theory; it is fixed by the nature of our paradigms of water.
To be water is to be the same liquid as this, where this can be (almost) any of the
paradigm examples of water’ (:–). I maintain that if both Toddler
Tim and Teenage Tim possess a concept of MUMMY’S-PLAYING-CHESS, then
we should take the same approach and say that the concept remains the same—
despite the fact that over time, Tim’s knowledge about what is involved in his
mother’s playing chess and the inferences he is willing to draw about situations
where he recognizes that this concept is applicable may change.
Now, one may question the assumption that Toddler Tim and Teenage Tim both
possess the conceptMUMMY’S-PLAYING-CHESS.We can lose concepts as well as
acquire them. Many of our infant concepts will play no role in our adult life; so it is
likely that many infant concepts are lost in development. For this reason, there is a
question as to whether Teenage Tim still possesses the atomic concept
Onemight think here that although the earlier and later concept may have the same referent, it is unarticulated
for the toddler and articulated for the teenager and in that sense is a different concept. But this depends on how one
thinks of articulation. My preference is to think of conceptual articulation in terms of establishing inferential
relations between concepts rather than concepts acquiring some sort of internal articulation. Thus, what
remains the same through the process of conceptual articulation is not merely the reference. I am thinking of
concepts as mental files. On my preferred picture what happens in the process of articulation is that the original
file remains the same but a new file is created and an inferential link is created between the original file and the
new file. One articulates the concept MUMMY’S-PLAYING-CHESS by creating an inferential link between the
concept MUMMY’S-PLAYING-CHESS and the concept PLAYING-CHESS.
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MUMMY’S-PLAYING-CHESS. It is possible that once Tim has the concepts
MUMMY, PLAYING, and CHESS, he no longer needs the concept
MUMMY’S-PLAYING-CHESS. In this case the adult attitude involves forming
something like a linguistically structured attitude that involves a number of
distinct concepts. One possible story about his development, then, is that Tim
loses the atomic concept in the course of development. Whether it happens will be
an empirical matter, and whether or not the concept is lost probably depends on
the importance in his adult life of his mother’s playing chess.
. Atomic Event Concepts, Holophrases, and Skilled Action
One might think that while infants need atomic event concepts because syntactically
structured thoughts require the mastery of public language, adults do not need such
concepts because we can think (and perhaps see that something is the case) using
syntactically structured representations. And so, the thought goes, adults lose any
atomic concepts of events that they are able to think of in compositional terms.
Here, once again, one can draw an analogy with linguistic representations. One
may think that, given the compositionality of language, our linguistic capacities
require only that we represent simple lexical items and syntactic rules for their
combination. However, there is overwhelming evidence that many seemingly
syntactically complex expressions are stored as individual lexical items. Similarly,
someone who possesses the concepts PET and FISH could also possess the distinct
concept PET-FISH. And it is even possible for someone to acquire the concept
PET-FISH before acquiring the other two; perhaps they were raised in a pet-fish
shop.
The two most obvious examples of apparently complex expressions that are
stored as individual lexical items are idioms and frequently used expressions.
(‘Like idioms, high frequency phrases also provide evidence for lexical storage of
multi-word items as single units, but units which are nonetheless analyzable into
their morphosemantic components’ [Bybee : ].) Idioms are syntactically
complex, with the speaker often understanding much of the syntactic structure,
but they seem to be stored in memory as single lexical units. Thus, Bybee ()
argues that ‘it is not controversial to claim that idioms are instances of multi-word
sequences that are stored in memory. . . Just because idioms are remembered as
wholes does not mean that their component parts and the semantic contribution
they make are not recognized. . . Even though a phrase such as pull strings, as in
John was able to pull strings to get the job, has a meaning that is different from
the literal combination of its parts, speakers recognize the two words in the phrase
as the same as those occurring in other combinations, and even recognize the
semantic contribution of these words’ (–).
We find a similar phenomenonwith frequently used expressions such as ‘I dunno’.
Such expressions may begin life as holophrases, but by adulthood, we are well aware
of their internal syntactic structure. There is, however, good evidence from
psycholinguistics that such expressions are indeed stored as single lexical items. As
Tomasello () explains, ‘for most speakers of English, I dunno is a fixed
expression with a single coherent meaning equivalent to a shrug of the shoulders.
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Its unitary status can be seen by the fact that the pronunciation involves many
reduced elements, and indeed on some occasions the word ‘don’t’ can hardly be
heard at all. But speakers may also break down this expression into its constituent
parts if the need arises. The phonological reductions involved in such cases result
from general principles of automaticity in which repetition of a skill leads to
smoother and less redundant movements in its execution. . . It is also possible that
parts of a construction may be automatized, and so unitized, while others are left
variable, as in mixed constructions such as Where’s-the X?, I-wanna X, Lemme
X, Gimme X, I’m-gonna X. The main point from an acquisition point of view is
that when a higher abstraction is made the lower-level, more concrete
constructions and expressions do not necessarily go away but may remain
available for use—especially if they are used frequently” ().
A similar story can be told about concepts. There are reasonswhy an organismmay
acquire and retain atomic event concepts even though the organism may have
developed the capacity to represent the events picked out by such atomic concepts
through combining simple concepts according to lexical rules. One plausible reason
for retaining both the simple representations and the seemingly more complex
representations may be speed. Applying and combining concepts takes time, and
time may be of the essence. For this reason atomic event concepts play an important
role in skilled activity, and their acquisition plays an important role in skill
acquisition. Such concepts can be very specific. Take the case of two professional
soccer players: Zübeyde and Gözde. Zübeyde has developed a capacity to recognize
situations in which Gözde is about to cross the ball to her and has learnt how to act
appropriately. This may involve a very specific recognitional capacity that involves
picking up on signals specific to Gözde. Now, if this is the case, and if Zübeyde has
learnt to re-identify and respond appropriately to instances of the event type ‘Gözde
is about to cross the ball’, then in Millikan’s sense, she possesses the substance
concept GÖZDE’S-CROSSING-THE-BALL. Zübeyde is thus likely to possess the
concepts GÖZDE and CROSSING-THE-BALL, but there may be situations where
it is possible for Zübeyde to recognize that Gözde is crossing the ball (applying the
concept GÖZDE’S-CROSSING-THE-BALL) without, at that moment, recognizing
Gözde (that is, without applying the concept GÖZDE).
Wemight think that recognizing that Gözde is about to cross the ball must involve
recognizing Gözde and so must involve the application of the concept GÖZDE as
part of the act of recognition. But this is not necessarily the case, for all that is
required is for Zübeyde to track Gözde and that this tracking has primed the
(atomic) concept GÖZDE’S-CROSSING-THE-BALL. She is anticipating a cross
and knows what to do if it comes. Now, this tracking may have begun with
Zübeyde recognizing Gözde, and so with her applying the concept GÖZDE. But
during the game, she is tracking many individuals simultaneously, and empirical
research, initially by Pylyshyn and his colleagues () on what they call
‘Multiple Object Tracking’ (MOT), suggests that such simultaneous tracking does
not involve the categorization of the objects once the tracking has begun. Thus,
for example, the tracking of an object is not disrupted by the object changing
color, size, shape, or kind during its motion (Pylyshyn : – and Carey
: –). It is possible that while Zübeyde is tracking Gözde and
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anticipating that she might be about to cross and therefore preparing herself to
pounce, she need not categorize her as Gözde—even though she is primed to
apply the concept GÖZDE’S-CROSSING-THE-BALL to the individual she is
tracking. In such a case, Zübeyde may see that Gözde is crossing the ball but not
necessarily recognize Gözde at the moment she recognizes that Gözde is crossing
the ball. This may seem a strange thing to say, but I think it captures something
about the nature of real time immersed skilled activity. What is important for the
activity is recognizing the event type (which may be an event type specific to a
particular individual, such as the event type of Gözde crossing the ball) and
responding appropriately. And there is no good reason to think that this
necessarily involves recognizing the individual involved in the event, even if the
event type is one specific to the individual. In such a situation it is possible for
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